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The weaponization of digital communications and social media to
conduct disinformation campaigns at immense scale, speed, and
reach presents new challenges to identify and counter hostile influ-
ence operations (IO). This paper presents an end-to-end framework
to automate detection of disinformation narratives, networks, and in-
fluential actors. The framework integrates natural language process-
ing, machine learning, graph analytics, and a novel network causal
inference approach to quantify the impact of individual actors in
spreading IO narratives. We demonstrate its capability on real-world
hostile IO campaigns with Twitter datasets collected during the 2017
French presidential elections, and known IO accounts disclosed by
Twitter. Our system detects IO accounts with 96% precision, 79%
recall, and 96% area-under-the-PR-curve, maps out salient network
communities, and discovers high-impact accounts that escape the
lens of traditional impact statistics based on activity counts and net-
work centrality. Results are corroborated with independent sources
of known IO accounts from U.S. Congressional reports, investigative
journalism, and IO datasets provided by Twitter.
Causal inference | Networks |Machine-learning | Social media | Influence operations
Though propaganda is an ancient mode of statecraft, theweaponization of digital communications and social media to
conduct disinformation campaigns at previously unobtainable scales,
speeds, and reach presents new challenges to identify and counter
hostile influence operations (1–5). Before the internet, the tools used
to conduct such campaigns adopted longstanding—but effective—
technologies. For example, Mao’s guerrilla strategy emphasizes—
“[p]ropaganda materials are very important. Every large guerrilla unit
should have a printing press and a mimeograph stone.” Today, many
powers have exploited the internet to spread propaganda and disinfor-
mation to weaken their competitors. For example, Russia’s official
military doctrine calls to “[e]xert simultaneous pressure on the enemy
throughout the enemy’s territory in the global information space” (6).
Online influence operations (IO) are enabled by the low cost,
scalability, automation, and speed provided by social media platforms
on which a variety of automated and semi-automated innovations are
used to spread disinformation (1, 2, 4). Situational awareness of semi-
automated IO at speed and scale requires a semi-automated response
capable of detecting and characterizing IO narratives and networks,
and estimating their impact either directly within the communications
medium, or more broadly in the actions and attitudes of the target
audience. This arena presents a challenging, fluid problem whose
measured data is comprised of large volumes of human- and machine-
generated multimedia content (7), many hybrid interactions within
a social media network (8), and actions or consequences resulting
from the IO campaign (9). These characteristics of modern IO can be
addressed by recent advances in machine learning in several relevant
fields: natural language processing (NLP), semi-supervised learning,
and network causal inference.
This paper presents a framework to automate detection and charac-
terization of IO campaigns. The novel contributions of the paper are:
(1) an end-to-end system to perform narrative detection, IO account
classification, network discovery, and estimation of IO causal impact;
(2) a method for detection and quantification of causal influence on a
network (8); and (3) application of this approach to genuine hostile IO
campaigns and datasets, with classifier and impact estimation perfor-
mance curves evaluated on confirmed IO networks. IO accounts are
corroborated using publicly available datasets, U.S. Congressional re-
ports, and reports from investigative journalists. Our system discovers
salient network communities and high-impact accounts in spreading
propaganda. The framework integrates natural language processing,
machine learning, graph analytics, and novel network causal inference
to quantify the impact of individual actors in spreading IO narratives.
To the extent possible, classifier performance is compared to other
online account classifiers.
Framework
The end-to-end system framework collects contextually relevant data,
identifies potential IO narratives, classifies accounts based on their
behavior and content, constructs a narrative network, and estimates
the impact of accounts or networks in spreading specific narratives
(Fig. 1). First, potentially relevant social media content is collected
using the Twitter public application programming interface (API)
based on keywords, accounts, languages, and spatiotemporal ranges.
Second, distinct narratives are identified using topic modeling, from
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Fig. 1. Framework block diagram of end-to-end IO detection and characterization.
which narratives of interest are identified by analysts. In general,
more sophisticated NLP techniques that exploit semantic similarity,
e.g. transformer models (10), can be used to identify salient narra-
tives. Third, accounts participating in the selected narrative receive an
IO classifier score based on their behavioral, linguistic, and content
features. The second and third steps may be repeated to provide a
more focused corpus for IO narrative detection. Fourth, the social
network of accounts participating in the IO narrative is constructed
using their pattern of interactions. Fifth, the unique impact of each
account—measured using its contribution to the narrative spread over
the network—is quantified using a novel network causal inference
methodology. The end product of this framework is a mapping of the
IO narrative network where IO accounts of high impact are identified.
Methodology
Targeted Collection. Contextually relevant Twitter data are col-
lected using the Twitter API based on keywords, accounts, languages,
and spatiotemporal filters specified by the authors. For example,
during the 2017 French presidential election, keywords include the
leading candidates, #Macron and #LePen, French election-related
issues, including hostile narratives expected to harm specific candi-
dates, e.g. voter abstention (11) and unsubstantiated allegations (12).
Because specific narratives and influential IO accounts are discovered
subsequently, they offer additional cues to either broaden or refocus
the collection. In the analysis described in the preceding subsection,
28 million Twitter posts and nearly 1 million accounts potentially
relevant to the 2017 French presidential election were collected over a
30-day period preceding the election, and a total of nearly 800 million
tweets and information on 13 million distinct accounts were collected.
Narrative Detection. Narratives are automatically generated from
the targeted Twitter data using a topic modeling algorithm (13). First,
accounts whose tweets contain keywords relevant to the subject, or
exhibit pre-defined, heuristic behavioral patterns within a relevant
time period are identified. Second, content from these accounts are
passed to a topic modeling algorithm, and all topics are represented by
a collection, or bag of words. Third, interesting topics are identified
manually. Fourth, tweets that match these topics above a pre-defined
threshold are selected. Fifth, a narrative network is constructed with
vertices defined by accounts whose content matches the selected
narrative, and edges defined by retweets between these accounts. In
the case of the 2017 French elections, the relevant keywords are:
‘Macron’, ‘leaks’, ‘election’, or ‘France’; the languages used in topic
modeling are English and French.
IO Account Classification. IO account classification is performed
with a semi-supervised machine-learning approach built using the
open source libraries scikit-learn and Snorkel (14, 15), and soft la-
beling functions based on heuristics of IO account metadata, content,
and behavior. The feature space comprises behaviorial characteristics,
profile characteristics, languages used, and the 1- and 2-grams used in
tweets; full details are provided in SI:C, and feature importances are
illustrated in the ‘Results’ section in Fig. 4. The classifier is trained
using data from the narrative networks constructed as described in
the preceding subsection and using truth from the publicly available
Twitter Elections Integrity dataset (7). Dimensionality reduction and
Fig. 2. Word clouds associated with the ‘offshore accounts’ topic in English (above)
and French (below). Topics are selected from those generated from the English corpus
(N = 152;203) and the French corpus (N = 1;070;158) as described in the SI.
classifier algorithm selection is performed by optimizing precision–
recall performance over a broad set of dimensionality reduction ap-
proaches, classifiers, and parameters (see SI:C). In the results section,
dimensionality reduction is performed with Extra-Trees (ET) (14) and
the classifer is the Random Forest (RF) algorithm (14). Ensemble
tree classifiers learn the complex concepts of IO account behaviors
and characteristics without over-fitting to the training data through a
collection of decision trees, each representing a simple concept using
only a few features.
Network Discovery. The narrative network—a social network of par-
ticipants involved in discussing and propagating a specific narrative—
is constructed from their observed pattern of interactions. In the
‘Results’ section, narrative networks are constructed using retweets.
Narrative networks and their pattern of influence are represented as
graphs whose edges represent strength of interactions. The (directed)
influence from (account) vertex vi to vertex v j is denoted by the
weighted edge ai j. For simplicty in the sequel, network vertex vi is
also referred to as i. The influence network is represented by the
adjacency matrixA = (ai j). Because actual influence is not directly
observable, the influence network is modeled as a random variable
with Poisson distribution parameterized by the observed evidence
of influence. Specifically, influence ai j is modeled with distribution
ai j ∼ Poisson(λi j = number of past interactions), as counts of interac-
tive influence in real-world networks (16).
Impact Estimation. Impact estimation is based on a novel method
that quantifies each account’s unique causal contribution to the overall
narrative propagation over the entire network. It accounts for social
confounders (e.g. community membership, popularity) and removes
their effects from the causal estimation. This approach is based on the
network potential outcome framework (17), itself based upon Rubin’s
causal framework (18). Mathematical details are provided in SI:D.
The fundamental quantity is the network potential outcome of each
vertex, denoted Yi(Z,A), under exposure to the narrative from the
source vector Z via the influence networkA. Precisely, Z is a binary
N-vector of narrative sources (a.k.a. treatment vector). In this study,
vertices are user accounts, edges represent influence as described in
2 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Smith et al.
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Fig. 3. P-R classifier performance with 3;151 known IO accounts (7) and language-
specific training data: combined English and French ( , N = 17;999); English
only ( , N = 13;155); French only ( , N = 13;159). Cross-validated using
a 90 : 10 split and all data (solid curves), and Snorkel positives omitted (dashed
curves).
‘Methodology: Network Discovery’, and the potential outcomes are
the number of tweets in the narrative. The impact ζi of each vertex on
the overall narrative propagation is defined using network potential
outcome differentials averaged over the entire network:
ζi(z)
def
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
(
Y j(Z = zi+,A) − Y j(Z = zi−,A)). [1]
This causal estimand is the average difference between the individual
outcomes with vi as a source such that zi+ := (z1, . . . , zi := 1, . . . , zN)T,
versus vi not a source, zi− := (z1, . . . , zi := 0, . . . , zN)T. This impact is
the average (per vertex) number of additional tweets generated by an
user’s participation in the narrative. The source is said to be uniquely
impactful if it is the only source.
It is impossible to observe the outcomes at each vertex with both
exposure conditions under source vectors zi+ and zi−; therefore, the
missing potential outcomes must be estimated, which can be accom-
plished using a model. After estimating the model parameters from
the observed outcomes and vertex covariates, missing potential out-
comes in the causal estimand ζi can be imputed using the fitted model.
Potential outcomes are modeled using a Poisson generalized linear
model (GLM) with the canonical log link function and linear predictor
coefficients (τ,γ,β, µ) corresponding to the source indicator Zi, n-hop
exposure vector s(n)i , the covariate vector xi, and the baseline outcome.
The covariate vector xi includes the potential social confounders such
as popularity and community membership. The GLM model for the
potential outcomes is
log λi = τZi +
(Nhop∑
n=1
n∏
k=1
τγk s
(n)
i
)
+ βTxi + µ + i, [2]
with Yi(Z,A) ∼ Poisson(λi), where τZi represents the primary effect
from the source,
∑Nhop
n=1
∏n
k=1 τγk s
(n)
i represents the accumulative so-
cial influence effect from n-hop exposures s(n)i to the source and γk
captures the decay of the effect over each additional hop, βTxi is the
effect of the unit covariates xi including potential social confounders
such as popularity and community membership, µ is the baseline
effect on the entire population, and i ∼ Normal(0, σ2 ) provides
Fig. 4. The 100 most important features in the French and English combined classifier,
represented by relative size in a word cloud.
independent and identically distributed variation for heterogeneity
between the units. The amounts of social exposure at the nth hop are
determined by (AT)nZ. This captures narrative propagation via all
exposure to sources within the narrative network. Diminishing return
of additional exposures is modeled using (nonnegative) log-exposure,
s(n) = log
(
(AT)nZ + 1
)
. Joint inference of the model parameters τ, γ,
β, µ, and the influence matrixA is computed through Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) and Bayesian regression.
Results
Targeted Collection. The targeted collection for the 2017 French
presidential election includes 28,896,185 potentially relevant tweets
and 999,883 distinct accounts, all collected over a 30-day period
preceding the election on 7 May 2017. Targeted collections for several
other IO scenarios were also collected during 2017, resulting in a
dataset with 782,678,201 tweets and 12,723,995 distinct accounts.
Most of these data do not concern the French election, but will provide
negative examples for IO classifier training.
Narrative Detection. Narratives immediately preceding the elec-
tion are generated automatically by dividing this broad content into
language groups, restricting the content and time period to election-
related posts within one week preceding the election’s media black-
out date of 5 May 2017, and filtering accounts based on interaction
with non-French media sites pushing narratives expected to harm
specific candidates. Topic modeling (13) is applied to the separate
English and French language corpora, and the resulting topics are
inspected by the authors to identify relevant narratives. Two such
narratives are illustrated in Fig. 2 by the most-frequent word and
emoji usage appearing in tweets included within the topic. From
the English corpus (N = 152,203), 15 topics are generated; from the
French (N = 1,070,158), 30 topics. These automatically generated
topics correspond closely to allegations claimed to be spread by Wiki-
Leaks, candidate Marine Le Pen, and others (19, 20). Two topics,
one in English and one in French, pertaining to unsubstantiated finan-
cial allegations (Fig. 2) will be used to identify accounts involved in
spreading these narratives, independent of whether the accounts were
used for narrative detection.
IO Account Classification. Twitter published IO truth data con-
taining 50,230 known IO account identities and their multimedia
content (7). This dataset is used along with heuristic rules to train a
semi-supervised classifier (15) using the approach described in the
‘Methodology’ section, and the rulesets are detailed in SI:C. The
classifier is trained using content from three distinct sources: known
IO accounts that have tweeted on any topic at least once in either
English or French (true examples), and a combination of randomly
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Fig. 5. Community membership in the French narrative network (Fig. 2). Colors show
inferred membership from a blockmodel (22).
selected topically relevant accounts and topically neutral accounts
(presumptively false examples). There are 3,151 known IO accounts
in our dataset that have tweeted in English or French. Because IO
accounts represent a small fraction of all Twitter accounts, e.g. 9–15%
of all Twitter accounts are estimated to be bots (21), 15, 000 presump-
tively false examples are randomly selected with 5, 000 each of three
false classes: topically relevant accounts that tweeted at least once
in English, at least once in French, and topically neutral, randomly
chosen from the general dataset.
Precision–Recall (P-R) Performance. P-R performance of the classi-
fier is computed via cross validation using the same dataset with a
90 : 10 split, averaged over 20 rounds (Fig. 3). Because the number of
known cases is limited, weak supervision from the heuristic Snorkel
labeling functions is used to identify true examples before cross vali-
dation (15). All training is performed with Snorkel-labeled data, and
cross validation is performed both using both Snorkel-labeled data
(solid curves in Fig. 3) and omitting Snorkel positives (dashed curves).
Sensitivity to language-specific training data is also computed by
restricting topically relevant, false examples to specific languages.
All classifiers exhibit comparably strong performance, and small
differences in relative performance is consistent with the authors’
expectations. All classifiers detect IO accounts with 96% precision
and 79% recall at a nominal operating point, 96% area-under-the-PR-
curve (AUPRC), and 8% equal-error rate (EER). The English-only
and French-only classifiers perform slightly better (nominally 0–3%)
than the combined language model, consistent with the expectation
that models with greater specificity outperform less specific models.
This strong classifier performance will be combined with additional
inferences—narrative networks, community structure, and impact
estimation—to identify potentially influential IO accounts involved in
spreading particular narratives.
With this dataset, the original feature space has dimension
1,896,163: 17 behavior and profile features, 61 languages, and
1,896,085 1- and 2-grams. Section SI:C lists the behavior, profile
features, and language features. Grid search over feature dimensional-
ity is used to identify the best feature set for dimensionality reduction:
10 behavioral and profile features, 30 language features, and 500
1- and 2-grams. The most important features used by the classifier
are illustrated by the relative sizes of feature names appearing in
the word cloud of Fig. 4. Note that the most important features for
IO account classification are independent of topic, and pertain instead
to account behaviorial characteristics and frequency of languages
other than English or French. This topic independence suggests the
potential applicability of the classifier to other IO narratives.
Macron allegations
Pro-Abstension
Pro-Macron
10 0.6
Fig. 6. Classifier scores over the French narrative network (Fig. 2). The 0–1 score
range indicates increasing similarity to known IO accounts.
Classifier Performance Comparisons. Several online IO account clas-
sifiers exist that are often cited in the press (23), notably Botometer
(formerly BotOrNot) (24) and Bot Sentinel (25). We compare the
P-R performance of our IO classifier to both Botometer and Bot Sen-
tinel. This comparison is complicated by three factors: (1) neither
Botometer nor Bot Sentinel have published classifier performance
against known IO accounts; (2) neither project has posted open source
code; and (3) known IO accounts are immediately suspended, which
prevents post hoc analysis with these online tools.
Therefore, a proxy for known IO accounts must be used for perfor-
mance comparisons. We use the observation that there exists strong
correlation between likely IO accounts in our narrative network and
membership in specific, distinguishable communities independently
computed using an MCMC-based blockmodel (22). Community mem-
bership of accounts in the French language narrative network (Fig. 2)
are illustrated in Fig. 5. Five distinct communities are detected, three
of which are identified to have promoted Macron allegation narratives.
The other two narratives promote pro-Macron and pro-abstension
narratives. Accounts in this narrative network are classified on a 0–1
scale of their similarity to known IO accounts, shown in Fig. 6. Com-
paring Figs. 5 and 6 shows that the great majority of accounts in the
‘Macron allegation’ communities are classified as highly similar to
known IO accounts, and conversely, the great majority of accounts
in the pro-Macron and pro-abstention communities are classified as
highly dissimilar to known IO accounts. This visual comparison is
quantified by the account histogram illustrated in SI Fig. S7.
Using membership in these ‘Macron allegation’ communities as
a proxy for known IO accounts, P-R performance is computed for
our IO classifier, Botometer and Bot Sentinel (Fig. 7). Given this
narrative network and truth proxy, both Botometer and Bot Sentinel
perform nominally at random chance of 63% precision, the fraction of
presumptive IO accounts. Our IO classifier has precision performance
of 82–85% over recalls of range 20–80%, which exceeds random
chance performance by 19–22%. Observed performance differences
are hypothesized to be caused by the intended design of Botometer or
Bot Sentinel, which is to detect general bot activity, not necessarily
the specific IO behavior on which our classifier is trained.
Network Discovery. Tweets that match topics of Fig. 2 are extracted
from the collected Twitter data. French-language tweets made in the
week leading up to the blackout period, 28 April through 5 May 2017,
are checked for similarity to the French language topic. To ensure the
inclusion of tweets on the #MacronLeaks data dump, which occurred
on the eve of the French media blackout, English-language tweets
from 29 April through 7 May 2017 are compared to the English topic.
In total, the French topic network consists of 6,927 accounts and the
4 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Smith et al.
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Fig. 7. Classifier performance comparison: Snorkel-based classifier ( , N = 415)
vs. Botometer ( , N = 289) vs. Bot Sentinel ( , N = 288), given proxy,
community-based truth. The dashed gray horizontal line at 63% is the fraction
of presumptively true examples in the community-based proxy for known IO accounts,
and therefore represents random chance precision performance.
English topic network consists of 1,897 accounts. For visual clarity,
network figures are generated on the most active accounts, 459 in the
French and 752 in the English networks.
Impact Estimation. Estimation on the causal impact of each account
in propagating the narrative is performed by computing the estimand
in Eq. (1), considering each account as the source. Unlike existing
propagation methods on network topology (26), causal inference ac-
counts also for the observed counts from each account to capture how
each source contributes to the subsequent tweets made by other ac-
counts. Results demonstrate this method’s advantage over traditional
impact statistics based on activity count and network topology alone.
Impact estimation and IO classification on the English narrative
network (Fig. 2) are demonstrated in Fig. 8. Graph vertices are Twitter
accounts sized by the causal impact score (i.e. posterior mean of the
causal estimand) and colored by the IO classifier using the same
scale as Fig. 6. Redness indicates account behavior and content like
known IO accounts, whereas blueness indicates the opposite. This
graph layout reveals two major communities involved in narrative
propagation of unsubstantiated financial allegations during the French
election. The large community at the top left comprises many accounts
whose behavior and content is consistent with known IO accounts.
The relatively smaller community at the lower right includes many
mainstream media accounts that publish reports on this narrative.
Within this mainstream journalism-focused community, the media
accounts AP, ABC, RT, and Reuters are among the most impactful,
consistent with expectation. The most remarkable result, however,
is that known IO accounts are among the most impactful among
the large community of IO-like accounts. The existence of these
IO accounts was known previously (7, 27), but not their impact in
spreading specific IO narratives. Also note the impactful IO accounts
(i.e. the large red vertices) in the upper community that appear to
target many benign accounts (i.e. the white and blue vertices).
A comparison between the causal impact and traditional impact
statistics is provided in Table 1 on several representative and/or note-
worthy accounts highlighted in Fig. 8. The prominent @RT_America,
a major Russian media outlet, and @JackPosobiec, a widely re-
ported (20) account in spreading this narrative, corroborate our esti-
mate of their very high causal impact scores. This is also consistent
with their early participation in this narrative, high tweet counts, high
number of followers, and large PageRank centralities. Conversely,
@UserA and @UserB have low impact statistics, and also receive low
causal impact scores as relatively non-impactful accounts.
Table 1. Comparison of impact statistics between accounts on the
English network: tweets (T), retweets (RT), followers (F), first tweet
time on 28 April, PageRank centrality (PR), and causal impact* (CI).
Screen name T RT F 1st time PR CI*
@RT_America 39 8 386k 12:00 2706 1.55
@JackPosobiec 28 123 23k 01:54 4690 1.43
@UserA† 8 0 1.4k 22:53 44 0.14
@UserB† 12 15 19k 12:27 151 0.41
@Pamela_Moore13 10 31 56k 18:46 97 1.65
@TEN_GOP 12 42 112k 22:15 191 1.38
*Estimate of the causal estimand in Equation [1]
†Anonymized screen names of currently active accounts
Known IO account (7–9, 27) @Pamela_Moore13’s involvement
in this narrative illustrates the relative strength of the causal impact
estimates in identifying relevant IO accounts. @Pamela_Moore13
stands out as one of the most prominent accounts spreading this nar-
rative. Yet ‘her’ other impact statistics (T, RT, F, PR) are not distinc-
tive, and comparable in value to the not-impactful account @UserB.
Additionally, known IO accounts @TEN_GOP and @TXCowboys-
Rawk (7, 27, 28), and Sputik writer @CassandraRules (29) all stand
out for their relatively high causal impact and IO account classifier
scores (Fig. 9). Causal impact estimation is shown to find high-impact
accounts that do not stand out using traditional impact statistics. This
estimation is accomplished by considering how the narrative propa-
gates over the influence network, and its utility is demonstrated using
data from known IO accounts on known IO narratives. Additional
impact estimation results are provided in SI:E.
Influential IO Account Detection. The outcome of the automated
framework proposed in this manuscript is the identification of influen-
tial IO accounts in spreading IO narratives. This is accomplished by
combining IO classifier scores with IO impact scores for a specific
narrative (Fig. 9). Accounts whose behavior and content appear like
known IO accounts and whose impact in spreading an IO narrative
is relatively high are of potential interest. Such accounts appear in
the upper-right side of the scatterplot illustrated in Fig. 9. Partial
validation of this approach is provided by the known IO accounts
discussed above. Many other accounts in the upper-right side of Fig. 9
have since been suspended by Twitter, and some at the time of writing
are actively spreading conspiracy theories about the 2020 coronavirus
pandemic (30). These currently-active accounts participate in IO-
aligned narratives across multiple geo-political regions and topics,
and no matter their authenticity, their content is used hundreds of
times by known IO accounts (7) (SI:F). As an effective tool for situ-
ational awareness, the framework in this manuscript can alert social
media platform providers and the public of influential IO accounts
and networks, and the content they spread.
Discussion
We present a framework to automate detection of disinformation nar-
ratives, networks, and influential actors. The framework integrates
NLP, machine-learning, graph analytics, and novel network causal in-
ference to quantify the impact of individual actors in spreading the IO
narrative. Application of this framework to several authentic influence
operation campaigns run during the 2017 French elections provides
alerts to likely IO accounts that are influential in spreading IO nar-
ratives. Our results are corroborated by independent press reports,
U.S. Congressional reports, and Twitter’s Elections Integrity public
dataset. The detection of IO narratives and high-impact accounts is
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Fig. 8. Impact network (accounts sized by impact) colored by IO classifier score on
the English narrative network Fig. 2). Known IO accounts are highlighted in triangles.
demonstrated on a dataset comprising 29 million Twitter posts and
1 million accounts collected in 30 days leading up to the 2017 French
elections. We also measure and compare the classification perfor-
mance of a novel semi-supervised classifier for IO accounts involved
in spreading specific IO narratives. At a representative operating point,
our classifier performs with 96% precision, 79% recall, 96% AUPRC,
and 8% EER. Our classifier precision is shown to outperform two
online Bot detectors by 20% (nominally) at this operating point, con-
ditioned on a network-community-based truth model. A novel causal
network inference approach is used to quantify the impact of accounts
spreading specific narratives. This method accounts for the influence
network topology and the observed volume from each account, and re-
moves the effects of social confounders (e.g. community membership,
popularity). We demonstrate the approach’s advantage over traditional
impact statistics based on activity count (e.g. tweet and retweet counts)
and network topology (e.g. network centralities) alone in discovering
high-impact IO accounts that are independently corroborated.
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A. Additional Background. Exploitation of social media and digital communications by world powers to achieve their political objectives (1–
18) at unprecedented scales, speeds, and reach presents a rising threat, especially to democratic societies (1, 3, 5, 6, 19, 20). Situational
awareness of influence campaigns and a better understanding of the mechanism behind social influence (4, 21) provide necessary capabilities
for potential responses (2, 7, 22). In other applications, social influence can even be harnessed to promote knowledge and best practices in
public policy settings for social good (23).
B. Narrative Detection Using Topic Modeling. Tweets were collected that are potentially relevant to a representative scenario in which
actual IO accounts were expected to be active: the 2017 French election. A large dataset containing both English and French language corpora
was created from this collection. From these corpora, 15 English language topics and 30 French topics are generated automatically using a
topic modeling algorithm (24). The set of generated English topics includes several relevant to the French election as well as topics on U.S.
politics and other world events. A selection of the English topics is shown in Table S1. The first topic relates to unsubstantiated financial
allegations; this is the topic used for network discovery in the main paper. The generated French topics are predominantly focused on the
French election, including a French language version of unsubstantiated financial allegations. A subset of these topics is shown in Table S2.
Note that in both tables and the sequel, the notation ‘:emoji_symbol:’ specifies an emoji symbol.
C. IO Account Classifier and Feature Engineering. The data used to train the IO classifier includes 3,151 known IO accounts released
by Twitter and 15,000 randomly selected accounts from three subsets of the targeted collection dataset: accounts that tweeted on the French
election in English, accounts that tweeted on the French election in French, and topic- and language-neutral accounts. Each subset contributes
5,000 accounts to the training dataset. Multiple feature categories are used: account behavior features, language features across all content, and
features derived from the content itself.
C.1. Heuristics for Semi-Supervised Learning. Because the quantity of known IO accounts is relatively small, a semi-supervised training
strategy based on Snorkel (25) is employed. In this approach, training data from known truth are augmented with weakly labeled training
data provided by heuristic ‘labeling functions’ (Table S3), and the learning model learns and incorporates labeling function inaccuracies.
Our Snorkel labeling functions are based on reported characteristics of IO account behavior, content, and metadata (26–29). These Snorkel
heuristics were then refined by applying them to a small validation set. One hundred accounts were randomly selected out of the 5,000 that
tweeted on the French election in English. An attempt was made to label each account as either a real person or an IO account by examining
their Twitter profile and current tweets. However, many accounts were either suspended or difficult to determine with confidence to which
category they belong. Of these 100 randomly chosen accounts, 24 were labeled as IO accounts, 31 were labeled non-IO, and the remaining
were discarded from the validation set.
Though 9–15% of all Twitter accounts are estimated to be bots (30), it is possible that the charged topics analyzed in the main paper contain
a higher proportion of bots and possible IO accounts. To account for this possibility in classifier training, all accounts that have a 70% or
higher likelihood of being IO-like, according to Snorkel, are labeled as IO accounts, and accounts below the 70% threshold are labeled as
non-IO accounts. This results in roughly 30% of the training accounts on the French election and 15% of the topic-neutral accounts being
labeled IO accounts. The proportions of each training data subset that falls above the threshold is given for three different points in Table S4.
C.2. Classifier Design Comparisons. Classifier design is conducted by comparing the relative performance of four different classifier models,
Random Forest (31), Logistic Regression, xgBoost (32), and SVM (33), and two dimensionality reduction approaches, Extra Trees (34)
and SVD. The performance of the all classifier design combinations over a grid of classifier parameters is evaluated via averaged cross
validation over twenty 90 : 10 splits. Cross validation is performed both over 10% of all training data (Fig. S2) and after discarding all accounts
that were labeled as IO-like by Snorkel heuristics (Fig. S1). Of the eight combinations and for both methods of cross validation, the best
performing method is composed of dimensionality reduction using the Extra Trees method followed by a Random Forest classifier (Figs.
S1, S2). We compare the P-R and ROC curves for Random Forest, Extra Trees across the two methods of cross validation in Figs. S3 and S4,
respectively. The standard deviation from cross-validation is shown in Fig. S3, in which it is seen that the maximum standard deviation
for when all data is used is 1.6%, and 3.2% when Snorkel positives are omitted. Although xgBoost with Extra Trees performs as well as
the Random Forest, Extra Trees classifier when the validation set includes 10% of all training data, it performs significantly worse when
the Snorkel-labeled IO accounts are discarded from the validation set. Further, examination of the performance of xgBoost, Extra Trees on
accounts in the narrative networks shows that the classifier scores tend to be skewed towards extremes, rather than being distributed more
evenly across the interval [0, 1] (Fig. S6).
C.3. Sensitivity Analysis and Performance Statistics. Snorkel is used to provide additional, semi-supervised training data by labeling IO
positives. A Snorkel score is computed for each account, and in the main paper, all accounts that exceed a score of 70% are treated as IO
truth within classifier training. This 70% threshold is determined by both a sensitivity analysis that compares classifier performance across
a range of metrics: precision–recall (P-R) at a fixed classifier score threshold (0.6 based on Fig. S7), area-under-the-PR-curve (AUPRC),
the equal-error rate (EER, Table S5), and the fraction of training accounts that are labeled positively by Snorkel (Table S4). Performance is
comparable across the three bracketed thresholds considered—50%, 70%, and 90%—though the 50% threshold has the worst performance
for most of the statistics. Retaining all training data within cross-validation sets (contra omitting Snorkel positives) is most consistent with
the objective of measuring classifier performance on actual accounts within a narrative network. The relative performance comparisons of
Table S5 (using all data) and Table S4 show that a 70% threshold has the best AUPRC, best recall, with a small (0.5–1.5%) trade-off in EER
and precision, and also the fraction of IO accounts at this threshold is consistent with published estimates of bot activity as discussed in C.1.
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C.4. Feature Engineering. The IO classifier is trained on three categories of features: account behavior, languages used in tweets, and all 1-
and 2-grams that appear more than 15 times across all account tweets in the training set. Initially, the feature set is composed of 17 behavioral
features, 60 language features, and 1.8 million 1- and 2-grams. To limit the per account content used to generate these content features, a
maximum of 10,000 randomly selected tweets are chosen from each account. The total number of tweets used in the English and French
classifier is 40,155,545.
The standard machine-learning dimensionality reduction step is used to improve classifier performance in problems like this one that
have a very large feature space relative to the number of training samples. Grid search optimization is used to determine the best-performing
dimensionality reduction approach, and the relative importance of each feature. In the dataset used in the main paper, the Extra Trees
algorithm is used to reduce the feature space to 10 behavioral features (Table S6), 30 languages (Table S7), and 500 1- and 2-grams (Table S8).
Additionally, the behavioral, language, and 1-and 2-gram feature spaces are each reduced independently of each other to ensure adequate
representation by each feature category.
C.5. Classifier Scores versus Account Status. As noted in section C.2, the Random Forest with Extra Trees combination is the best performing
classifier model. Its optimality is further justified upon examination of the distribution of the classifier scores across accounts in the French
narrative network (Fig. S5). The accounts are divided by current (March 2020) status as reported by the Twitter API: active, suspended, and
deleted. The suspended and deleted accounts are skewed toward higher classifier scores, showing a correlation between accounts detected by
the classifier and behavior that results in suspension from Twitter.
Although both the Random Forest/Extra Trees and xgBoost/Extra Trees classifiers have near-identical performance in Fig. S2, the latter’s
performance on the French narrative network is not nearly as promising. In Fig. S6, the classifier scores over the French narrative network tend
towards extremes for all three account status categories, in stark contrast to the more realistic distribution seen in Fig. S5.
C.6. Validation of Community-Based Proxy Truth. As discussed in the main paper section ‘Results: Classifier Performance Comparisons,’
membership in the ‘Macron allegations’ community of the French narrative network (main paper, Fig. 6) is used as a proxy for known
IO accounts where independent truth is unavailable. To establish the narratives used by accounts in the ‘Macron allegations’ community, topic
modeling is performed on tweets from accounts in the community over the week preceding the media blackout (28 April to 5 May 2017). A
selection of the generated topics is given in Table S9. Three representative tweets from each topic are shown in Table S10, which illustrate the
stance of accounts within this community. Topic modeling is performed on the tweets in the pro-Macron and pro-Abstention communities over
the same time period. A selection from those topics is given in Table S11 and Table S12, respectively.
To validate this proxy assumption and quantify its accuracy in the absence of the underlying truth, we hypothesize that: (1) the ‘Macron
allegations’ narrative is used by actual IO accounts in the 2017 French election; and (2) the distribution of known IO accounts is higher in IO
narrative networks. The first hypothesis is confirmed by numerous independent news reports (14, 19, 20, 35) and direct observation (3, 16, 36–
38). Though we do not have the ability to independently establish the validity of the second hypothesis, we can show that the validity of our
results are consistent with this hypothesis.
The distribution of our classifier scores is computed across both the ‘Macron allegations’ and ‘pro-Macron’/‘pro-abstention’ communities
in the French narrative network (Fig. S7). There is a distinct disparity between these histograms. Classifier scores of accounts in the ‘Macron
allegations’ community are relatively small at lower (non-IO-like) scores, and rise sharply to very high relative frequencies above a classifier
score of 0.6—the expected range of IO-like scores. In contrast, classifier scores across the other communities are more evenly distributed and
slightly skewed towards lower (non-IO-like) scores, also expected for narrative network communities dominated by pro-Macron activity.
D. Network Potential Outcome Framework for Causal Inference. Interference takes place in causal inference when the treatment applied
to one unit affects the outcomes of other units due to their interactions and influence. An example of rising importance is treating individuals
on a social network. This section introduces the mathematical framework of causal inference under network interference (39), used in the main
paper’s section ‘Methodology: Impact Estimation.’ Network potential outcomes are the fundamental quantity used to capture various types of
causal effects such as network impact in Eq. [1] of the main paper. Realistically, many network potential outcomes will be unobserved and
a complete randomization over the different treatment exposures is infeasible, making the estimation of the causal estimands challenging.
Bayesian imputation of the missing network potential outcomes provides a natural conceptual solution. Theory for this imputation is developed
based on the critical assumptions of unconfounded treatment assignment and an unconfounded influence network, leading to the key ignorability
condition for the treatment exposure mechanism. Driven by this theory, a rigorous design and analysis procedure is proposed for causal
inference under network interference.
D.1. Introduction. Interference, in the context of causal inference, refers to the situation when the outcome of a ‘unit’ is affected not only by its
own treatment, but also by the treatment of other units. Interference on a network of influence, known as network interference, is of rising
importance. Common examples are experiments and observational studies on a social network where treatment effects propagate through
peer influence, spread of knowledge, or social benefits, etc. This phenomenon is also known as spillover effects and social contagions. The
application areas are numerous, e.g. public health, education, and policy (40–43); social media and marketing (44–47); network security (4, 48);
and economics (49–51).
Traditionally, interference has been viewed as a nuisance in causal experiments, and earlier works propose experimental designs that render
the interference effects ignorable on restricted, simple block structures (52, 53). More recent work detects and estimates interference effects on
networks, many of them building on the potential outcome framework (54). To detect network interference effects, Bowers et al. (55) propose
hypothesis testings using potential outcome models with specific primary and peer effects, and Athey et al. (56) propose exact p-value tests by
constructing artificial experiments on the original experimental units such that the null hypothesis is sharp. To estimate network interference
effects, Aronow and Samii (57) propose inverse probability weighting when the probability of the specific exposure condition can be computed,
Ugander et al. (58) develop a cluster randomization approach that leads to a closed-form solution on the probabilities of specific neighborhood
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exposures, and Sussman and Airoldi (59) propose exclusion restrictions on the potential outcomes and derive design conditions that lead to
unbiased estimators. Social confounders present another source of challenge for causal inference under network interference. Early work by
Manski (51) demonstrates unidentifiability of the peer effects in the presence of social confounders under linear outcome models. Recent works
in causal inference show that confounding social covariates lead to unidentifiability and biased estimates of causal effects (60), especially on
social networks (61, 62), and how longitudinal studies (63, 64) and design of experiment for specific peer effects (65) provide a way forward.
D.2. Definitions. The key quantities are the potential outcomes of each unit in the study under different treatment conditions. They serve as the
basic building blocks for causal inference in the potential outcome framework. Most existing works assume an absence of interference and
a simple binary treatment assignment, which is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) (66). Under SUTVA, the potential
outcomes for each unit i are a function of its own treatment and are denoted as Yi(Zi), where Zi is a binary indicator for whether the treatment is
assigned to unit i. The potential outcomes of all N units in an experiment, Y , can be partitioned into two vectors of N components: Y (0) for
all outcomes under control and Y (1) for all outcomes under treatment. Y can also be partitioned according to whether it is observed. In an
experiment, a unit is either under control or under treatment. Therefore, half of all potential outcomes are observed, denoted as Yobs. The other
half of the potential outcomes are unobserved, denoted as Ymis. As a result, causal inference is fundamentally a missing data problem, with a
rich body of work on rigorous design and analysis for estimating and imputing the missing outcomes (67).
Under network interference, the potential outcome definitions need to be generalized to encompass the different treatment exposure
conditions via the network, starting with the units:
Definition 1 (Finite Population on a Network of Influence). The study takes place on a finite population of N units where their influence on
each other is represented as a N × N influence matrix A. Each element of the influence matrix, Ai j ∈ R, represents the strength of influence
unit i has on unit j. One may visualize this population network as a graph, G = (V,E), of which the node setV consists of the units of the
study (|V| = N) and the edge set E represents the none-zero entries of the influence matrix A.
The outcomes of each unit not only depend on its own treatment but also on exposure to treatments on other units propagated through the
influence network.
Definition 2 (Network Potential Outcomes). Under network interference, the outcomes of a unit i, change according to its exposure to the
treatment on the finite population Z, through the network of influence A. The network potential outcomes of i are denoted as Yi(Z,A).
Definition 3 (Network Potential Outcome Sets). The entire set of network potential outcomes for unit i isYi = {Yi(Z = z,A = a) } for all
z ∈ Z, a ∈ A, whereZ is the set of all possible assignments on the closed neighborhood of i andA is the set of all possible influence networks
on the closed neighborhood of i. The set of all network potential outcomes on the finite population with N units isY = {Y1,Y2, . . . ,YN }. Y
can also be partitioned based on whether it is observed. In an experiment, for each unit, only one of the numerous possible neighborhood
treatment in Z is realized. The set of observed network potential outcomes, typically of size N, is denoted as Yobs. Most of the network
potential outcomes will be unobserved. The set of unobserved outcomes, its size depending on the size of each unit’s closed neighborhood, is
denoted asYmis.
Lastly, covariates X on the network potential outcome units play a vital role in principled design and analysis for estimating and imputing
the unobserved outcomes. For k-dimensional covariates on the units, the matrix X has N × k elements. Under the scope here, the treatment
vector Z is limited to binary indicators for treatment versus control, but can be easily generalized for multi-level treatments.
D.3. Bayesian Imputation of Missing Outcomes and Unconfounded Assumptions. Under network interference, most of the potential outcomes
in the causal estimands will be unobserved. Furthermore, a complete randomized assignment of the different exposures to neighborhood
treatment is typically infeasible, as the structure of the influence network impacts each unit’s chance to receive a certain exposure (68). These
make the estimation of causal estimands challenging under network interference. A natural solution is to perform Bayesian imputation of
missing potential outcomes. Also known as the Bayesian predictive inference for causal effects, this method has been well established for
causal inference in the absence of interference (i.e. SUTVA holds) (69, 70).
As the potential outcomes serve as the building blocks for each causal estimand, computing the posterior distribution of the unobserved
potential outcomes also gives the posterior distribution of any causal estimands. In the regular case under SUTVA, the posterior distribution of
interest is P(Ymis|X ,Z,Yobs). Inference of the unobserved potential outcomes from the observed potential outcomes, the unit covariates X ,
and the treatment assignment vector Z, is typically done with a potential outcome model. Modeling and inference of this posterior distribution
is greatly simplified when the treatment assignment mechanism can be ignored (i.e. Z can be dropped from the posterior). Rubin shows how
the unconfounded treatment assignment assumption leads to this ignorability (69, 70).
In the case under network interference, the posterior distribution is on the expanded sets of network potential outcomes and includes
the influence network: P(Ymis|X ,Z,A,Yobs). Similar to the regular case under SUTVA, this posterior can also be greatly simplified when
the neighborhood treatment mechanism can be ignored (i.e. both Z and A can be dropped from the posterior). This section shows how the
assumptions of unconfounded treatment assignment and unconfounded influence network lead to this more extended ignorability. Under
network interference, although Bayesian imputation of the missing network potential outcomes offers a practical solution, the procedure needs
to respect the key unconfounded assumptions in order to avoid incorrect causal estimates.
Assumption 1 (Unconfounded Treatment Assignment Assumption Under Network Interference). Conditional on the relevant unit covariates
X and the influence network A, the treatment assignment Z is independent from the potential outcomesY:
P(Z |X ,A,Y) = P(Z |X ,A). [1]
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This assumption can be met in real-world experiments through complete randomization of Z or including possible confounders in the
conditional unit covariates X . Sometimes, experiments on a social network target units with certain network characteristics for treatment, in
order to achieve a desirable overall outcome. For example, a researcher may target the most influential units (e.g. high degree nodes) in order to
maximize peer influence effects. Assumption 1 holds under such treatment assignment strategies because the treatment Z only depends on the
influence network, A, and relevant unit covariates X . This paper estimates the impact of each unit as a potential source (i.e. being treated), so
the treatment assignment does not depend on the potential outcomes, satisfying Assumption 1.
Assumption 2 (Unconfounded Influence Network Assumption Under Network Interference). Conditional on the relevant unit covariates X ,
the influence network A is independent from the potential outcomesY:
P(A|X ,Y) = P(A|X). [2]
This assumption is met if the formation of the influence network has no correlation with the potential outcomes. However, this is often
not true in real-world experiments (62). Intuitively, correlation between the potential outcomes and the influence network may arise from
certain characteristics of a unit that are correlated with both its outcomes as well as its relationships with other units on the network. Activity
level and group memberships are examples of such characteristics. For example, an account’s node degree on the retweet network may be
positively correlated with its potential outcomes (i.e. tweet count on the IO narrative) because hubs in the influence network may tweet more in
general. Similarly, an account’s membership to an IO community may be positively correlated with its potential outcomes. Therefore, meeting
Assumption 2 will likely require including such confounding characteristics in the conditional unit covariates X . A method to achieve this will
be formally proposed in Theorem 2, but first, we introduce the ignorability condition.
Theorem 1 (Ignorable Treatment Exposure Mechanism Under Network Interference). If the unconfounded treatment assignment assumption
and the unconfounded influence network assumption are both met, the treatment exposure mechanism is ignorable and does not enter the
posterior distribution of the missing potential outcomes:
P(Ymis|X ,Z,A,Yobs) = P(Ymis|X ,Yobs). [3]
Theorem 1 is proved via factorization and application of Assumptions 1 and 2:
P(Ymis|X ,Z,A,Yobs) = P(Z |X ,A,Y)P(Y|X ,A)∫
P(Z |X ,A,Y)P(Y|X ,A) dYmis
=
P(Z |X ,A)P(Y|X ,A)
P(Z |X ,A) ∫ P(Y|X ,A) dYmis
=
P(Y|X ,A)∫
P(Y|X ,A) dYmis
= P(Ymis|X ,A,Yobs)
=
P(A|X ,Y)P(Y|X)∫
P(A|X ,Y)P(Y|X) dYmis
=
P(A|X)P(Y|X)
P(A|X) ∫ P(Y|X) dYmis
=
P(Y|X)∫
P(Y|X) dYmis
= P(Ymis|X ,Yobs). [4]
Finally, Assumption 2 can be satisfied by conditioning on network parameters through parametric modeling.
Theorem 2 (Unconfounded Influence Network by Conditioning on Network Parameters). The unconfounded influence network assumption in
Assumption 2, P(A|X ,Y) = P(A|X), is met if:
1. The distribution of the influence network A can be characterized by a model HG with nodal parameters XG and population parameters
ΘG: A ∼ HG(XG,ΘG);
2. The potential outcomesY correlate with the influence networkA only through a subset of the nodal parameters X˜G ∈XG and population
parameters Θ˜G ∈ ΘG;
3. The unit covariates X contain these network parameters X˜G and Θ˜G.
Theorem 2 leverages the assumption that the influence network A can be characterized by a model with nodal (i.e. unit-specific)
parameters XG (e.g. expected degree, community membership, position in the latent space, etc.) and population parametersΘG (e.g. inter-
community interaction, sparsity, etc.). Most if not all of the currently well-known network models in the network inference community can be
described in this way, including the latent space models (71), the latent class models such as the membership blockmodels (72–74), degree
distribution models (75, 76), and the graphon (77). Typically, only a subset of the nodal parameters, X˜G, may be correlated with the potential
outcomes, like the unit-specific characteristics such as activity level and community membership in the IO narrative influence network. Some
of the population parameters, Θ˜G, like sparsity, may be correlated with the potential outcomes as well. Intuitively, conditioning on these
parameters breaks the correlation between the potential outcomes and the influence network, therefore meeting the unconfounded influence
network assumption. Often, these network model parameters are not readily observed, but they can be estimated from the social network data
collected in the experiment. This is similar in spirit to work by Frangakis and Rubin (78) on latent ignorability where the treatment mechanism
is ignorable by conditioning on the latent compliance covariate.
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D.4. Theory to Practice: Design and Analysis Under Network Interference. Driven by the theoretical framework developed above, the experi-
mental and analytical procedure for Bayesian imputation of missing potential outcomes and causal estimands is summarized in the following
steps.
1. Define the population, the treatment, and the network potential outcomes. Collect prior information on the underlying influence network.
This can be from data on interactions between the units (e.g. emails, tweets, phone calls, etc.) or a survey on the social network (e.g. list
of relationships). One may only have partial or prior information on the influence network, in which case the network will need to be
imputed during analysis.
2. Propose an appropriate network model and estimate the model parameters using the observed influence network or the prior distribution
on the influence network.
3. Propose an appropriate potential outcome model including all the possible confounding covariates, guided by Assumptions 1 and 2, and
Theorem 2, in order to meet the ignorable treatment exposure mechanism condition specified in Theorem 1. Some of these may be the
estimated network parameters from the previous step and the possible treatment assignment confounders. Perform Bayesian inference to
compute the posterior distributions of the potential outcome model parameters, jointly with the influence network if it is not fully known,
as typically is the case.
4. Using the posterior distributions from the step above, impute the missing network potential outcomes in the causal estimands of interest,
and finally arrive at the posterior distribution of the causal estimands, the quantity of interest.
This procedure accounts for potential confounders through covariate adjustment, where accuracy depends on the adequacy of the potential
outcome model. Additional robustness to model mis-specification can be achieved through balancing of confounding covariates across different
treatment exposure conditions in the causal estimand. This can be done via treatment design in experiments or matching in observational
studies, as a desirable future expansion on this framework.
E. Impact Estimation on the #MacronLeaks Narrative. Further support of this framework’s efficacy is provided by its application to
a well-known, highly visible, and distinctive IO narrative network defined by a simple Twitter hashtag, #MacronLeaks (35, 38) (Fig. S8).
Vertex color in Fig. S8 indicates the number of times each account tweets the hashtag #MacronLeaks; vertex size is the in-degree, i.e. the
number of retweets received by each account. Compared to the financial allegation narrative detected via topic modeling in the main paper, this
narrative is on a related but more focused event of the leaking of candidate Macron’s emails. While many IO narratives do not align nicely
with a hashtag and need to be detected via topic modeling, the #MacronLeaks narrative is an instance where the hashtag became a prominent
signature for the narrative. The hashtag was widely used in many tweets and retweets, as reflected by the higher magnitude impact statistics in
Table S13, compared to Table 1 in the main paper. Among the accounts with high estimated impact, there exists independent confirmation of
the prominence of the two accounts @wikileaks and @JackPosobiec in pushing the #MacronLeaks narrative (35). The relatively high causal
impact of these accounts shown in Table S13 is consistent with independently reported articles about this narrative. Further, a new finding is
the high-impact spreading of this IO narrative by the known IO account @Pamela_Moore13 (36, 37).
Comparison between impact statistics in Table S13 highlights the advantage of causal impact estimation in quantifying impact over activity-
and topologically based statistics such as retweet (RT) volume and PageRank centrality (79, 80). The limitation of activity count statistics
as indicators for impact is seen in @UserA and @UserC, both having high tweet and retweet counts but little impact due to their positions
on and connectivities to the network with low centrality. Follower count and PageRank centrality clearly highlight @wikileaks’s impact on
the network, which is consistent with its high causal impact. However, accounts such as @JackPosobiec, @UserB, and known IO account
@Pamela_Moore13 have only a medium level of PageRank centrality, but high causal impact. @JackPosobiec, being one of the earliest
participant, has been reported as a key source in pushing the #MacronLeaks narrative (35). @UserB serves as a bridge into the predominantly
French-speaking subgraph (the cluster seen in the middle of Fig. S8). Causal impact is able to detect these prominent accounts that do not
stand out in other impact statistics by modeling the narrative propagation on the network. Unlike existing propagation methods on network
topology (81) alone, causal inference accounts also for the observed outcomes at each node.
F. Influential IO-like Content 2017 vs. 2020. Many of the high-impact accounts with behaviors and content similar to known IO accounts
(upper-right corner of main paper Fig. 9) have been suspended by Twitter since 2017. However, several remain actively engaged at the time
of writing in narratives also used by IO accounts in 2020 (12, 82, 83). For example, high-impact, IO-like accounts that posted on the 2017
French election narrative network (main paper Figs. 2, 6) are actively posting three years later on COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Additional
validation of this paper’s approach is suggested by examining how the content of such active accounts has been used by known IO accounts.
Inspecting a small-but-representative sample of 3 active accounts appearing in the upper-right corner of Fig. 9 of the main paper shows that
content from these accounts has been used by known IO accounts hundreds of times (9 in one case, 472 in another, and 589 in another) for each
of these active accounts (37). Furthermore, we observe that our classifier is robust to whether or not these accounts are directly retweeted by
known IO accounts. Only 5 tweets from these 3 representative accounts (1, 1, and 3 tweets for each account) were included in our classifier as
‘positive’ examples used by known IO accounts, whereas 555 tweets (total for all 3) were retweeted by accounts included as negative examples
in the training data. Because the classifier training data is comprised of 40 million tweets, the presence of 5 tweets from these specific accounts
does not have a large effect on their positive classification, especially that their content appears 555 times in non-IO ‘negative’ training data.
Finally, note that we do not assert or imply that these are IO accounts, but merely observe that their content and behavior is quantifiably similar
to known IO accounts, independent of their authenticity. This observation is consistent with the fact that content from these specific accounts
has also been used hundreds of times (as retweets) by known IO accounts (37, 84).
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Table S1. Select English topics.
Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4
Anti-Macron, financial
allegations
May 1st protest in Paris Brexit Russia and Middle East
macron police brexit syria
tax antifa news russia
documents paris win sptnkne.ws
emmanuel day amp syrian
evasion mayday2017 twitter.com isis
engaging on.rt.com britain russian
putin protesters brussels turkey
trump breaking theresa sputniknews.com
huge video ukip military
disobedientmedia.com anti labour amp
on.rt.com amp macron attack
prove arrested election army
busted officers europe war
news news pen israel
cheat violent on.rt.com news
rally violence ge2017 putin
breaking texas telegraph.co.uk killed
phone portland juncker on.rt.com
harrisburg left :united_kingdom: ukraine
nato pen politics nato
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Table S2. Select French topics.
Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topics 4
Anti-Macron, financial
allegations
Final debate of 2017
election
Police violence at May
1st protests
Islamophobia during
election
macron macron paris macron
compte débat crs uoif
journaliste 2017ledébat policiers youtube.com
fiscale marine gauche watch
plainte pen mai islamistes
offshore debat2017 1er voter
:red_circle: soir blessés soutenu
mort france 1ermai jamaismacron
documents plateau extrême france
macrongate menace policier musulmans
emmanuel quitter macron islamiste
porte 2017ledébat brûlé soutien
twitter.com debat police :france:
bahamas brigitte france emmanuel
évasion mlp :france: jamais
preuves lepen molotov :thumbs_down:
france tours violences juifs
pen faire théo frères
fraude bout ordre lyon
société heure cgt 2017lédebat
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Table S3. IO account heuristics (26–29) as Snorkel labeling functions.
# Account has no profile description
@labeling_function()
def profile_length(x):
return IO if x.profile_length==0 else ABSTAIN
# Account has repeated interactions with external news sites
@labeling_function()
def external_news__interactions(x):
return IO if x.num_external__news_interactions > 5 else ABSTAIN
# Account follows large number of accounts
@labeling_function()
def num_following(x):
return IO if x.following_count > 3000 else ABSTAIN
# On average, every tweet includes a link
@labeling_function()
def num_links(x):
return IO if x.avg_num_links > 1 else ABSTAIN
# Account tweeted in many languages
@labeling_function()
def many_langs(x):
return IO if np.count_nonzero(x.num_langs_used) > 10 else ABSTAIN
# Account rarely favorited tweets
@labeling_function()
def few_faves(x):
return IO if x.num_faves <20 else ABSTAIN
# Account favorited large number of tweets
@labeling_function()
def too_many_faves(x):
return IO if x.num_faves >30000 else ABSTAIN
#Account tweeted in an undetermined language often
@labeling_function()
def many_und_tweets(x):
return IO if x.und > 0.05 else ABSTAIN
# Account has follow, following counts indicative of real user
@labeling_function()
def normal_people_ff_ratio(x):
return REAL if x.follower_count < 500 and 0.75 < x.followers_following_ratio < 4 else ABSTAIN
# Account interacted with external news source once or never
@labeling_function()
def no_external_news__interactions(x):
return REAL if x.num_news__news_interactions < 2 else ABSTAIN
#Account seldom included links in tweets
@labeling_function()
def few_tweets_w_links(x):
return REAL if 0.05 < x.ratio_tweets_w_links_all_tweets < 0.15 else ABSTAIN
# Number of likes by account in normal range
@labeling_function()
def normal_num_likes(x):
return REAL if 500 < x.num_faves < 10000 else ABSTAIN
# Profile description of a normal length
@labeling_function()
def normal_profile_len(x):
return REAL if x.profile_length > 50 else ABSTAIN
# Many legitimate organizations have large number of followers, don’t want to classify them as IO~accounts
@labeling_function()
def org_num_followers(x):
return REAL if x.follower_count > 60000 else ABSTAIN
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Table S4. Proportion of training data subsets labeled as IO accounts by Snorkel heuristics.
50% threshold 70% threshold 90% threshold
French election, English 38% 32% 23%
French election, French 34% 28% 22%
Topic and language neutral 30% 15% 8%
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Fig. S1. Classifier P-R performance across many classifier algorithms. Validation set selected from known IO accounts and negatively labeled Snorkel data.
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Fig. S2. Classifier P-R performance across many classifier algorithms. Validation set selected from all data.
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Fig. S3. RF / ET classifier precision–recall (P-R) performance with cross-validation error over twenty 90 : 10 splits; all data ( ), and Snorkel positives omitted ( ).
Maximum standard deviation (gray region, ) is 0:016 and 0:032, respectively.
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Fig. S4. RF / ET classifier receiver operating characteristic (ROC) performance: true positive rate (TPR, a.k.a. recall) versus false positive rate (FPR); all data ( ), and
Snorkel positives omitted ( ). Classifier EER is determined by the point at which 1− TPR = FPR (dashed gray curve, ).
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Table S5. Sensitivity comparison, Snorkel thresholds for IO labeling and cross validation set selection.
Precision Recall AUPRC EER
50% threshold, all data 94.3% 78.7% 95.8% 10.5%
50% threshold, omit Snorkel positives 88.2% 91.6% 96.9% 6.1%
70% threshold, all data 95.6% 78.9% 96.4% 8.1%
70% threshold, omit Snorkel positives 91.6% 90.3% 96.6% 5.6%
90% threshold, all data 97.1% 73.5% 96.0% 7.6%
90% threshold, omit Snorkel positives 95.8% 90.5% 97.4% 5.0%
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Table S6. Behavioral features in descending importance.
num_external_news_interactions num_tweets_in_time_range follower_count
avg_num_chars sd_num_tweets_per_day profile_length
avg_num_hashtag_chars ratio_retweets_w_links_all_tweets
num_faves avg_num_tweets_per_day
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Table S7. Language features in descending importance (Twitter language codes).
en de ht nl pl eu
sr fr tl cs no ca
it sl ro da lt fi
und pt ru sv lv hu
in es et tr cy hi
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Table S8. Top 150 1- and 2-grams* (out of 500) in descending order of importance.
en:serbia en:serbiaaustria en:investigation
en:macron en:vucˇic´ en:nursultan
fr:lepen en:aleksandarvucˇic´ en:friends
en:france en:serbianpresident en:18
fr:macron en:campaign en:jeffsessions
en:presidentserbia en:mueller en:nursultannazarbayev
en:lepen en:country en:smarttraffic
fr:france en:government en:jeff
en:belgrade en:germany en:robertmueller
fr:pen en:sessions en:foreign
en:serbian en:attack en:euroatlantic
en:serbiaamp en:israel en:follow
en:aleksandar en:meeting en:terrorist
fr:marine en:presidential en:beautiful
en:election en:merkel en:girl
en:forum en:aleksandarvucic en:palaceserbia
fr:fillon en:nazarbayev55qsospayr en:close
en:le fr:merkel en:congress
en:president en:strike en:presidentielle2017
fr:emmanuel en:night en:probe
fr:emmanuelmacron en:exerciseorganised en:organisednato
en:french en:55qsospayr en:countries
en::serbia: en:report en:firing
en:trump fr:lepenmacron en:arrested
en:amp en:team en:china
en:lepen en:american en:press
en:pen en:frenchelection en:missile
en:vote en:fbi en:khashoggi
en:people en:life en:visit
en:2 en:emmanuel en:presidentialelection
en:discussed en:watch en:syrian
fr:faut en:emmanuelmacron en:nazarbayev
en:video en:leaks en:congressparticipants
en:day en:war en:minister
fr:macronlepen en:hostinglargest en:heart
en:vucic en:special en:proof
en:win en:natoeuro en:citizens
en:businessforum en:participantspresident en:prince
en:austria en:photocongress en:share
fr:parti en:atlanticdi en:crisis
en:russian en:family en:familyphoto
en:breaking en:iran en:presidentnursultan
en:syria en:killed en:turkey
en:obama en:children en:business
en:news en:emails en:participants
en:love en:largestdisaster en:happening
en:support en:kosovo en:disasterresponse
en:live en:robert en:including
en:eu en:saudi en:francemacron
en:amphosting en:attacks fr:cqfd
*2-grams are represented by two words separated by the visible space character ‘’.
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Fig. S5. Classifier score histograms (Random Forest/Extra Trees) for active, suspended, and deleted accounts in the French narrative network.
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Fig. S6. Classifier score histograms (xgBoost/Extra Trees) for active, suspended, and deleted accounts in the French narrative network.
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Fig. S7. Relative classifier score frequencies between communities (main paper, Fig. 6).
Steven T. Smith, Edward K. Kao, Erika D. Mackin, Danelle C. Shah, Olga Simek, and Donald B. Rubin 21 of 30
Table S9. Select French topics from the three Macron allegations communities.
Topic A Topic B Topic C
Macron, police violence
at May 1st protests
Macron, immigration
and Islam
Macron, financial
allegations
macron macron macron
policiers france france
gauche français soutien
paris oradour marie
crs marine emmanuel
france shoah uoif
extrême loi garaud
mai veut marine
1er 2017ledébat pen
blessés frontières voter
1ermai faire compte
police emmanuel porte
policier guerre candidat
brûlé campagne plainte
twitter.com immigration fiscale
ordre ans appelle
guillon islamiste islamistes
mort travail hollande
:france: étrangers grande
forces vote 2017ledébat
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Table S10. Representative tweets of the Topics in Table S9.
Topic A Topic B Topic C
Macron, police violence
at May 1st protests
Macron, immigration
and Islam
Macron, financial
allegations
[id 535820307] Rottweiller83
@rottweiller83 · 5:26 AM - 28 April
2017 · Retweeted
Du matériel #ToutSaufMacron a été
volé lors d’une agression ultra
violente de 2 jeunes par un gang
pro- Macron. Nous allons porter
plainte :france:
[id 799704104004100096] M-J
:latin_cross: :star_of_david: :france:
@Cal_369 · 2:20 PM - 30 April
2017
@EmmanuelMacron Rothschild :
appels de fond pour vous financer.
Caché au public ! #MacronNon
http://www.valeursactuelles.com/politique/coulisses-
politiques-quand-rothschild-
sponsorise-macron-72133
[id 4856695311] Alain Thomas
@AlainThomas1 · 1:15 PM-
28 April 2017 · Retweeted
Du très très lourd sur @Macron ,
banquier pourri , “enflure bancaire”
financé par Goldman Sachs !
Gravissime ! TWEET ET
RETWEET
[id 789035544021983232] Julia
:france: :pig: :sun: :butterfly:
@mamititi31 · 7:33 PM - 1 May
2017 · Retweeted
Les vrais facistes sont ceux qui,à
l’extrême gauche,manifestent et
cassent en ce moment,refusant le
résultat du 1er tour des
présidentielles
[id 2983945431] l’oranaise
@L_oranaise_ · 4:09 PM - 4 May
2017 · Retweeted
voilà ce qui nous attend avec
#Macron et après ca voile
obligatoire pour les femmes et
jeunes filles? :angry_face:
:angry_face: :angry_face:
[id 768475921112104960] l’oranaise
@Pascal Azoulay · 8:25 AM -
4 May 2017 · Retweeted
#MacronGates : Voici 1 copie pour
un chèque déposé par Macron
dans la banque Nevis as an
Offshore Asset Prot C’est bien
[id 775389437672947717] Frexit_2017
@avril_sylvie · 7:33 PM - 1 May
2017 · Retweeted
La porte-parole de #Macron appelle
à la violence contre Marine et nos
forces de l’ordre. Effarant.
[id 304858372] MAXIMUS DECIMUS
@lorquaphilip · 7:33 PM - 1 May
2017 · Retweeted
Après avoir nié l’existence de la
culture française, Macron nie
désormais l’existence de la France.
[id 799704104004100096] M-J
:latin_cross: :star_of_david: :france:
@Cal_369 · 1:00 AM - 4 May 2017
@JackPosobiec #2017LeDebat
C’est donc là que sont fric non
déclaré à pris la fuite !
https://www.les-crises.fr/emmanuel-
macron-36-millions-deuros-de-
revenus-cumules-patrimoine-
negatif/
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Table S11. Select French topics from the pro-Macron/anti-Le Pen/anti-abstention community.
Topic A Topic B Topic C
pro-Macron and anti-Le
Pen
pro-Macron and
anti-abstention
Final election debate:
lead-up and event
ensemble macron pen
france voter 2017ledebat
veux vote marine
macron pen macron
projet tour lepen
europe appelle débat
république mélenchon programme
pays faire 2017ledébat
national france euro
français insoumis mlp
mai blanc debat2017
jevotemacron abstention mme
politique mai projet
macrondirect marine soir
liberté lepen jevotemacron
:france: faut jamais
porte emmanuel france
macronpresident 1er madame
2017ledébat twitter.com faire
jt20h dimanche twitter.com
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Table S12. Select French topics from the pro-abstention community.
Topic A Topic B Topic C
Support for Jean-Luc
Mélenchon
Support of abstention Criticism of Macron and
Le Pen
mélenchon twitter.com macron
jean macron pen
france faire marine
mai voter utm
insoumis vote emmanuel
franceinsoumise tour article
1er mélenchon source
législatives insoumis fillon
1ermai sansmoile7mai perdu
insoumise pen débat
tour faut politique
luc lepen discours
youtu.be oui france
rdls26 jlm twitter
paris mlp candidat
youtube.com veut campaign
melenchon abstention social
legislatives2017 blanc medium
watch électeurs lafarge
présidentielle voix bit.ly
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@Pamela_Moore13
-..)/01
2/23%04%4
@RedPillDropper
@wikileaks
@JackPosobiec
@UserA
@UserB
Impact: 4.84
Impact: 0.80
Impact: 5.60
Impact: 0.05Impact: 4.18
Impact: 1.80
255
Nodes colored by
#MacronLeaks tweet count
0
 #MacronLeaks Retweet Network
Impact: 4.16
@UserC
Account
suspended
Account
suspended
Fig. S8. Causal impact of highlighted accounts on the #MacronLeaks narrative network. Vertices are accounts and edges are retweets. Vertex color indicates the number of
tweets and the vertex size corresponds to in-degrees. Causal impact is the average number of additional tweets generated by an user’s participation (main paper Eq. [1]).
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Table S13. Comparison of impact statistics between accounts on the #MacronLeaks narrative network: tweets (T), total retweets (TRT), most
retweeted tweet (MRT), followers (F), first tweet time on 5 May, PageRank centrality (PR), and causal impact* (CI).
Screen name T TRT MRT F 1st time PR CI*
@JackPosobiec 95 47k 5k 261k 18:49 667.2 5.60
@RedPillDropper 32 8k 3k 8k 19:33 43.54 1.80
@UserA† 256 59k 8k 1k 19:34 7.36 0.05
@UserB† 260 54k 8k 3k 20:25 424.37 4.84
@wikileaks 25 63k 7k 5515k 20:32 9293.56 4.18
@Pamela_Moore13 4 4k 2k 54k 21:14 293.93 4.16
@UserC† 1305 51k 8k < 1k 22:16 5.79 0.80
*Estimate of the causal estimand in Eq. [1] of the main paper
†Anonymized screen names of currently active accounts
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